This paper examines the relationship between law and compassion from the perspective of two diverse scholars. For philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, rejecting the idea homo homini lupus, there can simply be no organized society but for a primordial, unauthorized, human vocation for compassion (egoism and violence, for him, are nothing but attempts to repress this). Levinas, however, must be understood, as speaking of compassion not in the usual sense, that is as involving a human capacity for, and cultures of, empathy; he defines it, rather, in phenomenological terms, as an irreducible excess of affectivity for the ultimately meaningless suffering of another, beyond all theodicy and causality, whom one is ethically commanded to offer succour to as if s/he is a 'higher' and absolutely unique Other, prior to any comparison and judgement. General legal principles and rigorous rules, Natural Justice and positive law are equally 'born' of such an-archic, individuated, compassion for which one can only retroactively account. Justice is 'born' as one attempts to justify to third parties why one's care benefits some but not others; the paper argues that this perspective is preferable to prioritizing empathic compassion over law for it binds compassion with responsibility. Turning to Giorgio Agamben, the role of compassion takes on a darker character; his historicized investigations of the 'western-Christian' paradigm shows how the Greek and Roman legal principles of epieikeia, and aequitas merged with the Christian postulates of God-dictated philanthropy and 'divine economy' (Gr: oikonomia), leadinginstead of ethical anarchy followed by with infinite responsibility (Levinas) -to anomie, legal exceptionalism and social control via patronage and other bio-political practices to spectacles of compassion. This suggests that what Levinas calls 'ethical anarchy' has been captured by economic rationality and endless processes of anomic management that are equally free of ethical constraints as they are from legal and political decision. With reference to contemporary examples from the 'law and emotion' debates, medical laws and humanitarianism, the paper asks the reader to ponder upon the importance, if any, of Levinas' thesis in a world where the expediency of managerial rationality, the secular heir of divine oikonomia, prevails over moral, legal and political principle.
I. Introduction
While some marginalise and others emphasise the importance of the emotion of compassion as an aspect of legal justice each of the two continental philosophers examined here offer a distinctive perspective.
For Emmanuel Levinas compassion is not to be studied as part of a philosophy of moral feeling or a psychology of empathy but, as a key aspect of an existential, pre-reflexive human 'ethical vocation' for infinite ethical responsibility towards the other as other, which precedes language (and thus consciousness and the unconscious) and which makes possible all social phenomena, starting with language. Society presupposes existents that cannot but direct thoughtless compassion at specific others who 'obsess' us causing us to act without thought for third persons. Justice is born as we reflect upon this anarchic privileging of only some and strive to account for it before all those third others. Legal as well as political justice are the domains in which said striving takes place continuously and inconclusively. In sum, for Levinas, compassion is both the irreducibly 'anarchic' condition of possibility of sociality and a source of embarrassment that causes us to try and deal with others dispassionately for instance by recourse to general principles of legal or social justice. This effort is inconclusive and never-ending in so far as critique reveals that such dispassionate sobriety is always found lacking, that is, in so far as we are exposed as caring for some more than others (our children, our fellow-citizens, those whose suffering we can empathise with). In this sense compassion is both the reason for and the limit of theories of justice (for example, as is well known, in John Rawls' Justice as Fairness the application of principles of equality and liberty that are meant to ensure that the "least advantaged" are benefitted and not hurt or forgotten, rests on the presumption of a "veil of ignorance." But while the latter may be efficacious on the level of conscious cognizance, this is not necessarily the case once we consider the psychanalytic category of the unconscious or the Levinasian category of 'ethical vocation'.) Moving from Levinas's universalist ethics to Giorgio Agamben's genealogical study of the bio-political Western-Christian legal and political paradigm the emphasis on compassion remains even if in an entirely different sense. As explained above, Levinas depicts anarchic compassion as the condition of all sociality which legal and political philosophies try to structure and justify. By contrast, Agamben argues that specifically in the Christian and postChristian Western imagination compassion signifies as an instance anarchic economy that is assumed as always already 'justified' because providential not only in theology but also in political theology. A part of his historicised argument is that the related Greek and Roman legal principles of epieikeia and aequitas merged, in Christian Byzantium, with the postulate of providential 'divine economy' (Gr: oikonomia) in a way that serves to justify legal exceptionalism or/and social control via pastoralism. Thus, we must beware lest spectacles of selective suffering and compassion are used to justify the ad hoc suspension of the rigor of domestic or international laws, for instance in relation to 'humanitarian' interventions. Equally, compassion should not be an excuse for populist politicians offering selective patronage and the usual gap between their electoral promises and post-electoral policy uturns. This paper reads Agamben's thesis as suggesting that, at least in the Western legal and political paradigm, what Levinas calls compassion's 'ethical anarchy' is instrumentalised at the expense of both the rule of law and of democracy, and in favor of bio-politics and anomic management. With reference to contemporary examples from the 'law and emotion' debates, medical law and humanitarianism, the paper asks the reader to ponder upon the importance, if any, of Levinas' ethical thesis in a world where the expediency of managerial rationality, the secular heir of divine providential oikonomia, prevails over moral, legal and political principle in all but name.
II. 'Law is born to anarchic compassion': an ethical relation.
'Is not the evil of suffering… also the un-assumable, whence the possibility of a half opening that a moan, a cry, a groan or a sigh slips through -the original call for aid, for curative help, help from the other me whose alterity, whose exteriority promises salvation? […] For pure suffering, which is intrinsically senseless and condemned to itself with no way out, a beyond appears in the form of the inter-human.' (Levinas, 2001, pp. 165-166.) Emmanuel Levinas wrote that legal and political judgements are 'born of charity…' (Levinas, 2001, pp. 165-166) ; to understand that we have to also take on board his view that at the 'diachronic' level, society is not reducible to either economy, politics, law or religion all of which are meaningful at the 'synchronic level". To say that, diachronically and universally, legal and political systems are 'born of charity…' is to presuppose an irreducible, as well as inescapable, existential human vocation for asymmetrical openness to and hospitality for the vulnerable other. Throughout history sectarian religions with the help of theodicies, have provided suffering with meaning and justifications. In Levinas' atheist ethics, however, all suffering is evil beyond meaningfulness and redemption. Strictly speaking 'to suffer' is to undergo an impact that is too much; it is passivity; it is to be subjected to what is too intense for it to be objectified by the suffering self as a coherent experience; when for example another steps on my foot, for a split second, I undergo a strong sensation without yet reflecting, before I recuperate and can think of what happened and pass judgement. Thus, Levinas spoke of suffering as an impasse, an absurdity, and, so, utterly 'useless' (Levinas, 1998, pp. 91-101) , Now, in so far as such pure, pre-reflective, meaningless, suffering that shows in the face of the unfortunate other is witnessed, it is a "scandal"; the witness, scandalized by meaninglessness, is thus prompted to reach out to the sufferer: either to provide succours or to try and hide it. Although Levinas sometimes called this 'compassion' he more regularly called it gratuitous responsibility for useless suffering; this is not empathy (which some people feel more than others) but an inescapable human condition: to care for the other. Unconditional hospitality and succour of the suffering other are offered, as one of two possible options, when confronted with a scandalous shameful realisation: (i) first, the realization of non-interchangeability and alterity: although it is totally reasonable to assume that another person enjoys and suffers in ways similar to mine, I cannot enjoy or suffer in his or her place; (ii) second, the embarrassment that comes with the realization that, simply by occupying 'a place under the sun' I/we displace another or rob them of a possible refuge (consider the current European immigration crisis). Indifference is not an option; the only alternative to offering hospitality and succors is violence against the disturbingly suffering other: examples abound in history with the Nazi's treatment of the ill still fresh in our memory; but the elimination of the sufferer so as to avoid exposure to the absurdity of suffering is an ultimately vain attempt to remove the embarrassment; even when the sufferer dies -the mind goes to those refugees drowning in the Mediterranean sea -or is locked out of sight -say in a closed refugee camp -her ghost continues to haunt us.
To gauge the relevance, if any, of Levinas' take on compassion qua inescapable, gratuitous responsibility for useless or 'absurd' suffering to contemporary secular and nonfascist political and legal orders, Levinasian terminology must be first be introduced and explained. A central role in his godless metaphysics is played by the expression face-to-face which connotes a pre-reflective phase of human proximity; irrespectively of what I can make of a neighbour her 'face' signifies pure irreducible alterity and demands to be cared for as if s/he was an absolutely unique and also higher 'Other'; it cannot be stressed enough that such proximity refers to a pre-reflexive experience of sociality which the daily confrontation with any empirical others' face epitomizes; starting with the parent's face whose unintelligible voice commands the infant and summons it to come out of its stupor and become a responsive human. It is from this primacy of affectivity over reflexivity that Levinas derives the 'irreducibly ethical' dimension of his face-to-face ethics. The capital 'O' of the term 'Other' suggests that the encounter with an empirical other produces an affective surplus over the idea and image 'of' said other held by myself/my community.
Though knowable, as member of a species or genus, the absurdly vulnerable or actually uselessly suffering other obsesses me as 'Other' through her 'disincarnate' face, that is: as a unique site of vulnerability or subjection to meaningless suffering in excess of identity, essence, representation, knowledge and meaning and, hence, of theodicy and causality.
Consequently, in the here and now of every encounter with a concrete being -even if this is taking place in the very formal setting of the law court -its 'naked', uniquely vulnerable, Face 'summons' me/us not as a knowing 'I'/ 'we' and self-same subject (for example, the legal judge or the social worker as professional or/and as a particular kind of psychic structures with specific inclinations, biases etc.) but the individual/collective Self as Me/Us in the accusative -an ethically individuated subjectivity called forth by the other whose suffering I/we cannot ultimate reduce to a matter of theodicy or scientific causality. Every suffering, no matter how caused, even self-inflicted, concerns me/us personally as a 'scandal'. This scandal signifies the situation of our proximity as inescapably personal no matter how formal or mediated the setting, and proscribes me/us with an 'infinite' and 'anarchic', pre-reflective (thus pre-legal, pre-political, pre-religious) responsibility for the other's 'nakedness' (that is, vulnerability to suffering) in excess of law, politics, religion etc. This is producing a 'counter-intentional' affectivity in the adult subject who feels responsible for a 'unique' Other even as it knows him/her to be comparable and interchangeable. In sum, Levinas' phenomenological terms the Self as ethical subjectivity, or Me (by extension Us), refers to a pre-conscious, pre-reflexive, non-intentional, state of affectivity in which both the conceptual and iconic distinctions 'self-other' are not yet established or, if they are, they implode; hence the individual/collective ethical subjectivity as me/us is distinguished from the idea of the singular/collective 'ego' of self-same identity ('I'/'we') that includes consciousness and 'the unconscious'.
In turn, one must ask, who is my/our neighbour who compels me/us to gratuitous concern with alleviating their pain as a matter of priority? Anyone with a 'face', answers (Critchley, 2014 (Critchley, [1992 ). For example, using Levinasian terms, I have written of the face of the permanently vegetative patient (PVS) in English medical law (Diamantides, 2000a (Diamantides, , 2000b 2000c To appreciate Levinas' admittedly complex thesis one must do no less than set aside key assumptions in the dominant paradigm of legal and political anthropology; that legal and political institutions were created by man in order to 'put an end', or at least to give meaning or a useful structure, to suffering and violence; and that man is either absolutely free in his relations with the world and the possibilities that solicit action from him (idealism), or mere prey to material needs (reductivist materialism). In Levinas' materialist metaphysics the human is neither free spirit nor bound matter but an existent that experiences the absoluteness of materially-based individual and social existence dramatically, as an unbearable 'burden,' or an inescapable contract into which s/he never voluntarily entered. It is on the basis of such premises that Levinas analysed human society in terms of the face-to-face as 'primary sociality' (Levinas, 1969, p. 304) '…whose whole intensity consists in not presupposing the idea of community' (Hand, 2001, pp. 83-84) but, instead, the idea of infinity (Levinas, 1969) . The idea of infinity, per Levinas, obsesses us even as it is a signifier without a signified; it is, rather, experienced in the flesh as an excess of affectivity and responsibility over knowable and calculable duty in the onerous, indeed 'other' obsesses the (singular or collective) 'self' as if s/he were the only one that matters.
Said differently, what we tend to forget is that legal or political justice proceed from the individuated, daily human experience of a pre-reflexive, obsessive, hyperbolic, extralegal and extra-political, anarchic ethical obligation to open up to and alleviate another's suffering as always meaningless and absurd (that is, irrespectively of any theodicy or natural causality) and 'as if unique' (prior to any comparison and calculation). As soon as by political/legal 'justice' and right' we mean a public reasoned discourse of measured and accountable sociability, however, one must account for what now can appear to third parties ('the Third' in Levinas' jargon) to be merely one's compassionate predilections;
hence the importance of publicly demonstrating that one treats equally, or at least equitably, comparable cases. One simply can't say: 'I did x for y outside the frame of extant law because my conscience so demanded' unless one is prepared to die like Antigone did.
On the other hand, human laws rarely demand of us to justify why we empathize with and care for 'our own' (our children, our friends, our compatriots) more than for others (in Genesis, God, the religious version of the absolute Other, did ask Abraham to love him to the point of sacrificing his son; in human history this demand is almost always repeated by the collective, in the form of sacrificing ourselves and our children in war against others, but never for others, save in recent 'humanitarian wars' of which I write below).
If indeed our established legal and political orders tend to 'forget' that inter-human compassion is their condition of possibility, rather than the other way around, however, Levinas did not propose that remembering alone suffices to reverse this situation. In other words, his was not a plea for a return to some version of natural law prioritized over positive law. Rather, he described the relation of ethics to law/politics as an interminable existential drama with ethical consequences. For example, I spoke above of those British judges in the Bland case who tried but failed to hide their personal ethical responsibility for the PVS patient. The failure shows amply in the absurd statement, made by one judge, that ending his life is in conformity with his 'best interests' (the legal precedent) because he has no interests to speak of whatsoever. At such moments, as Levinas put it, the (individual or collective) Self as ethical subjectivity ('Me'/'Us') appears 'in the form of an ego, anachronously delayed behind its present moment, and unable to recuperate this delaythat is, in the form of an ego unable to conceive what is "touching" it' (Levinas, 1999, p. 101). It is in such diachronic circumstances that any particular other appears as an awesome, unique, 'higher', Other whose suffering requires us to risk providing succors, and that my/our Ego (say, as judges bound to follow, not make, the law) is left shocked, speechless, humbled, its self-referentiality interrupted. Thus the 'me/us' connotes the (individual or collective) Ego as constituted in persecution by and obsession with 'alterity.'
This, Levinas argued, gives rise to the only truly universal, human right-cum-duty to responsibility which, anarchically, dislodges the rational quest to determine once and for all the right 'relation' of law/politics and compassion. In other words acting compassionately can only retain an 'ethical' character if the subject is understood as individually responsible for having failed to authorize its compassion with reference to a theory that settles or synthesizes its legal/political responsibility with its anarchic desire to act compassionately.
The fact that we become social animals out of inescapable, gratuitous, individuate compassion that fails to be justified but that, subsequently, we tend to think of society as our, or our ancestors', (political/legal) accomplishment is an important aspect of our existential condition. At its most fundamental level, however, the Self ('I' or 'we') does not were devoted to the other man before being devoted to myself' (Hand, 1989, p. 34) . Apart from deconstructive readings of the law this perspective has also had already a (hitherto modest) reconstructive impact on jurisprudence. As Desmond Manderson puts it: in just the way that Levinas sees ethics as 'first philosophy', so, in (the common) law, the status of 'first law' should be attributed to the law of torts and the so-called 'duty of care' (which describes a personal responsibility that we owe to others and which has been placed on us without our consent) (Manderson, 2006, p. 206) . The wider implication is that, instead of assuming that the law has its basis on individual rights, freedom, autonomy and contract, we can see it as based on the individual's un-chosen obligations, where their autonomy and freedom are questioned. This model reverses the sequential precedence afforded to the austerity of law over compassion in all dominant Western accounts. I will come back to the deconstructive and reconstructive uses of Levinas in critical jurisprudence in the conclusion.
Coming to the matter at hand, I submit, the Levinasian premise of an anarchic compassion in the form not of empathy but of a gratuitous and excessive ethical responsibility for 'useless suffering' overcomes some of the most serious problems associated with compassion as empathy whereby the latter is understood, contrary to Levinas, as a quality of the ego and its counter-part, the 'unconscious.' First, whereas: expressing the 'boundless emotion' or 'passion' of compassion (Arendt, 1963, pp. 70-90) .
If Levinas is right that any legal/political justice always presupposes anarchic compassion, there is no need, in order to be compassionate, to imitate Jesus who came 'not to destroy but fulfil the law' and make exceptions or discounts to the extant law. Thus, for example, the manner in which, in the last few decades, aggressive military expeditions in contravention of international law have been exceptionally justified as 'humanitarian' and, eventually, have been accepted as a new species of legal intervention, without proper debate, is not something that we could defend with reference to Levinasian ethics. Rather, the latter's insistence that one can never fully justify one's concern for an instance of suffering means that, in his scheme, it is precisely such unjustifiable concern that gives rise to the necessity to justify it in the eyes of third others. This, however, is a conversation that can never end: if the very law in our disposal is always already born to charity we need to set aside the lies we tell about its 'foundations' and acknowledge that all law is destined to remain as unfounded, as charity is anarchic; we can never truly justify why we prioritize the suffering and vulnerability of some (say of our own children, or compatriots etc.) over others'. In sum, while Levinas wrote of the ontological primacy of the 'anarchy' of compassion over legal and political right, he did not advocate anarchism. All he suggested, I
understand, is that right does not proceed from might but from the weakness of man and that it is not a formula; as we try and fail to account for our compassionate predilections we construct vulnerable, de-constructible and necessary visions of (legal and political) justice.
III. Law and compassion in the Western theo-political tradition: an economic/anomic relation?
As we saw, Levinas felt the need to argue that law and politics are born of an ethically demanded anarchic compassion, which they subsequently attempt to retroactively authorize. I am turning now to a very different thinker, Giorgio Agamben, who defends the thesis that in the western tradition, at least since Christianization, the prevailing rationality is only ostensibly one which centers on legal and political authority (Agamben, 1998; 2000; 2004; 2010; 2011; 2013; 2016) ; in reality, he argues, the prevailing mode of governance is administrative/managerial and anomic. Juxtaposing these diverse theories is interesting since the relation of 'ethical anarchy' to legal/political authority, central in Levinas' account, may turn out, from an Agambian perspective, to be one of un-ethical anomie. Moreover, as I presently discuss, in Giorgio Agamben's historical account of the Western (Greek-RomanChristian) legal and political paradigm the issue of the relation of law to compassion gets special mention and acquires a different, darker, character than in Levinas' a-historical ethics. As Agamben points out, Byzantine rulers set the scene when they began to suspend laws ostensibly in the name of Christian compassion but, in reality, as part of a shift away from Greek democracy, early Roman republicanism and Roman autocracy, towards a biopolitical manner of government (Agamben, 2011) (Diamantides, 2000b (Diamantides, , 2000c . The second aspect of the composite western paradigm, postulates a third element that encompasses, without dissolving, these binaryrelational encryptions of reality and stabilizes their 'tension'. The Stoics introduced for this purpose the ideas of Logos and Pneuma (Gr: spirit), which were then substituted in the medieval period by the Christian postulates of the Triune God but also the idea that the world is organized as a huge household (Gr: oikos). In this regard, I have already mentioned the possibility that Trinitarianism still over-determines our thinking; as for the idea of the world as an oikos it is apposite to say that if this was originally believed to be a house 'owned' by God, later, with secularization, it is the 'people' as nation and, now, as 'humanity' that are expected to play the role of house master.
Here, what is important to retain from Agamben's complex narrative is, first, that in the scheme he presents all differences are imagined as contained by the idea of a relational unity (according to the image of the Triune who is one and yet consists of the relations of its constituent hypostases); and that the classical Greek distinction between the oikos/household and polis/politics was enveloped in the Christian imagination by the notion of oikonomia; heralding the beginning of bio-politics and managerialism the rise of the Trinitarian God and the vision of the social as household gave rise to an imagination whereby all binary distinctions -for example, for our purposes: law/compassion -require not synthesis or resolution but flexible management and administrative, rather than legal, political or ethical rationality. In fact, this (Trinitarian) economic political theology eventually made possible, in the sixth or seventh century canon law of the Byzantine Church, a new meaning of 'exception' (to a rule or principle) referred to as oikonomia. Oikonomia, which in classical Greece had meant the a-political administration of a household, had by then become the mysterious divine praxis undertaken for the salvation of humankind. 5 The second lesson from Agamben's thesis is directly relevant to the discussion at hand. The theological idea of exception-as-oikonomia came to coalesce with, respectively, the Greek and Roman legal concepts of epieikeia and aequitas, fairness and justice, and ultimately came to justify the anomic dispensation (dispensa) that relieves one from too rigid an application of the canons in imitation of divine compassion for humanity (Agamben, 2011, p. 49) . This process marked a shift in the exercise of power in the Byzantine political and legal system: dispensation from the law gradually replaced legislation as the main expression of sovereignty and Byzantine rulers found it equally expedient to gain legitimacy by appearing as merciful Christians, for example by annulling onerous contracts binding the meek but also pardoning their corrupt officials. claims, has long been substituted, first, by carefully orchestrated ritualistic acclamations of the 'charitable' sovereign in the medieval era (with the decisive input of religious authorities) and, today, by media-manipulated construction of 'public opinion' regarding the public good (with the decisive input of 'experts' -say, on the economy or security). The crucial point then and now is that the 'sovereign' (be it the Christian monarch or the 'people') do not really rule through their decisions; rather, their decisions follow the dictates of those who know or purport to know how 'to manage' the situation. 6 Today, this rigor of the laws and the introduction of extenuating circumstances, which "economizes"…the command of law in view of the weakness of those who must receive it.' (Cited in Agamben, 2011, p. 49.) 6 Thus, in Byzantium effective power lied not solely with the emperor as 'legibus solutus' but also with the civil and clerical bureaucracy. Likewise, in the case of the occidental medieval king effective power rested with the majordomo of the occidental anointed King. Eventually, as the king's household servants gradually transmuted into a nation-wide civil service and impersonal bureaucracy, the latter's effective power often replaced in all by name the much criticized royal absolutism. At the same time, the western trajectory from the High Middle Ages onwards is marked by the rise of increasingly differentiated professions (lawyers and politicians, economists and scientists, etc.) as well as interest groups. Arguably, their input into political and legal decision-making is more decisive than we like to think. Hence, for example, the reticence of Parliaments critique is becoming increasingly relevant what with the constant talk of crisis of legitimacy and trust in government. As many now talk of imploding political sovereignty (say, in Greece) as well aas protracted legal exceptionalism (for example, wherever, open-ended states of emergency have been declared), it is easier to be persuaded by the critics that ours is not a culture of legal and/or political krisis (Gr: decision) but of perpetual crisis requiring not principled decision/judgement but management. Said differently, Agamben's challenge is that for over two millennia of western history, behind the 'façade' of (legally or politically defined) sovereignty there is anomic administration without government. 7 This alleged historical gradual passage from principled krisis/decision to the 'economic,' flexible and, ultimately, anomic management of interminable crises, casts in a new light the topic at hand.
Wilkinson (2017) 8 , after a substantial review of the relevant literature, identifies the 'relation' of compassion to law (and, we could add, to politics, too) as a perennially controversial one. That is, law and compassion neither merge nor separate, remaining locked together in a way that invites not resolution and synthesis but constant management of controversy. The suspicion arises that the perpetual controversy regarding the 'relation' of law (and politics) to compassion, and more generally regarding the relation of reason and affect, is, perhaps not best understood as a dialectic (that can actually lead to a more complete understanding of judgement and decision on suffering). Rather, the controversy can be said to function as a permanent source of dispute and tension which, thus, occasions ever more oikonomia namely the prevalence of administrative over legal or political rationality. In fact, as the critics of the 'law and emotion' literature today elaborate (see below), the various 'economies of compassion' that accompany contemporary Western to remove many historical 'prerogatives' of the Executive but also to legislate so-called framework Acts' that leave wide discretionary powers to the executive (e.g. in pardoning criminals, waging 'humanitarian wars or choosing to save private banks from bankruptcy by using public funds) subject only to the advice of bureaucrats who derive their legitimacy neither from democracy nor from law but from their expertise.
legal and political practices can be seen as offering no more than a moral gloss to anomic biases and exceptions that frequently lead -in fact, but also, not seldom, by intention -to horrific consequences or/and to anomic preferentialism/patronage, for example, in the development aid industry that (allegedly) perpetuates dependencies of south to north even after de-colonization.
Thus, for example, few Greeks today would accept that the violation of EU's own rules (prohibiting helping member states address the results of their own violation of Eurozone's acceptable deficit levels) in order to 'save' Greece from official bankruptcy was mostly, if at all, an act of compassionate solidarity. Most see it as a means of putting Greece in the position of a 'protectorate'. Irrespectively of where one stands on this, it is difficult to deny that, as administrative/managerial logic prevails, clarity on issues that are central to philosophy, ethics, political science and jurisprudence in this regard is hard to find. For another example, on the level of international law and relations no one is in position to categorically state why a humanitarian intervention is truly justifiable here but not there, or whether its illegitimacy under international law can still be excused by reference to its humanitarian motives when confronted with millions of dead and displaced people that constitute the intervention's 'collateral damage.' In national law, too, it is an impossible task to ascertain solid grounds for compassion in, say, key medical law cases. Is compassion at all relevant when a court is confronted with an insensate permanently vegetating patient and the dispute between a Catholic nurse who considers any life as 'sacred' and the doctor and relatives who wish to offer the patient an easy-way out as in the aforementioned Bland case? As far as we know, the very definition of death that western courts use (in that case and beyond) was made up in the late sixties not on the basis of some scientific discovery but on pragmatic reasons.
9
It is in the light of this confusion that I understand how it is possible that, today, 'compassion' is appropriated on behalf of both liberal and conservative political agendas, and used as a pretext to promote the extension both of leftist state welfare policies as well 9 As Peter Singer explains the re-definition of death from cardiac-to brain-death happened in response to new technologies that had made it possible to keep artifically alive patients whose consciousness had been irretrievably lost but whose vital organs could now be used as transplants (Singer, 1996) .
as neo-liberal ethics of self-reliance (Amble, 2011) . It is always important to note the actual prevailing conditions in which debates take place and the same of course holds true of the law/compassion debate. In this regard I note how in the rich Global North immediate exposure to suffering and death is rare (for example, critically ill and dead relatives are quickly isolated as opposed to pre-modern customs of mourning the dead at home 10 ). Also no pre-or extra-legal compassion is actually allowed (for instance, suicide is permissible but assisted suicide is prescribed in most jurisdictions even in cases of the terminally ill). On the other hand, however, media-tised, graphic reports of specific distant sufferings, carefully contrived to elicit shock and upset are ubiquitous, and often instrumental for the crafting of public opinion so as to focus on specific causes and campaigns.
In the context of such abundant compassion-by-proxy, carefully manipulated by both governmental powers and non-governmental organizations eager for donations much of which go towards their operational costs, some, like Martha Nussbaum, see a need for cultivating an 'intelligence of compassion,' while others find that this task is compromised because emotional experience is all but confined to ephemeral 'intensities' or fleeting 'sensations' (Woodward, 2002, p. 224) . Moreover, ours is a culture of unstoppable commodification, where it is possible to buy a 'fair trade' coffee from a multinational company thus indulging the fantasy that by doing so one has discharged a 'political' duty inside a new 'cosmopolitan political community' sustained by globalized compassionate sentiment towards instances of suffering that receive media coverage. Whereas some see the advent of a new 'empathic civilization' others note that the routine exposure to graphic scenes of human suffering from one's television or computer makes people feel politically powerless and frustrates and denies any dispensation to true compassion (Boltanski, 2012 (Boltanski, [1990 ); one thinks of those 'likes' in facebook of postings relating to various tragedies or
injustices. Yet others, such as Slavoj Žižek, see in such ephemeral modern humanitarianism the actual preclusion of any genuine commitment to radical, structural social change. liberal or the Marxian variety -and provisionally accepts unprincipled exercises of public power often in the form of legal exceptionalism but also political u-turns and broken promises. It has even been suggested that humanitarianism is 'sold' to the masses as a form of 'the pornography of pain', a way of relating portrayals of other humans' suffering as a 'delicious horror' (Rozario, 2003) . In any case, any attempt to suggest that compassion should play a bigger role in public affairs can easily be attacked as enhancing a situation of expedient anomie. Consider the episode in 2016 when the televised cries of a Palestinian refugee child embarrassed the German Chancellor who had just given said child a televised lesson in Kantian morality while explaining to her why she could not stay in Germany: the politician decided to suspend the 'Dublin Treaty', first in connection to that one girl, then to as many refugees as the German economy could absorb before, finally re-closing the borders. In these circumstances, Levinas' ethical thesis that law (and politics) are 'born' to anarchic compassion which then 'forget' their provenance, must be revisited and questioned in view of the thesis that the real triumph of our era is not of the rule of law or/and democracy but of oikonomia/anomic management falsely presented as principled exercise of sovereignty. In bio-political settings -where the polis is in fact substituted by oikos, and law (and politics) by administration and crisis management -the 'remembering'
and 'forgetting' of compassion occurs incessantly, their 'controversy' kept alive, so as to provide us with the widest imaginable margin of freedom to manage human populations.
IV. Conclusion
I have presented two perspectives, which are difficult to reconcile but I hope, useful to juxtapose. In conclusion, allow me to re-present each with an example from my personal experience. Holidaying on a rented yacht in the sea between the Greek islands the Turkish coast in August 2015, we came across one of the overcrowded inflatable dinghies on which Syrian refugees were making their perilous trip to Europe. Our skipper called the Greek coast guard who ordered him not to allow any refugees on board (which is considered Greek territory) and, instead, to wait for them who would arrest them. As hours passed and the children were crying the skipper and we decided to let some on-board. From a Levinasian point of view this compassionate defiance of the law is ethically warranted:
diachronically speaking there can be no organized society without welcoming the stranger and prioritizing her suffering. But from a synchronic point of view other questions arise:
were we not, by allowing these people aboard, not contributing to an economy of compassion that includes, say, the humanitarian interventions of the West in some parts of the Middle East -which led to unintended disasters such as the rise of fundamentalism and civil war -and the non-intervention in the Syrian civil war? Could it be that we had been particularly influenced by the sight of Chancellor Merkel on TV making a temporary u-turn in her policy and allowing a certain number of refugees in Germany against the Dublin Treaty just before re-closing the border? Were we being 'ethically anarchic' or duped by economies and spectacles of compassion?
For Levinas, ethical compassion for the proximate other 'as the only one that matters' is not fundamentally based on empathy (which some have less than others) nor on general, moral, legal or political duty; it is, rather, the sign of inescapable, inexhaustible responsibility for the 'scandal' of suffering which is always, in each instance, too much and too meaningless, beyond theodicy and causality. As such it is the sine qua non of sociality on the basis of which moral, legal and political orders -religious or secular -are built. This suggests that law and politics must recognize the subject's 'relation' to the idea of infinity which is 'not in fact a relation' but an experience of the anarchy of the other's alterity and uniqueness even if the price is the breaking of law's self-same identity and the shaming of the egoism of politics of self-interest. In jurisprudence these ideas have both generated deconstructive readings (for instance, my discussion of the Bland case earlier) and reconstructive proposals (for instance, the aforementioned position by Manderson that we should substitute un-chosen obligations as the basis of law instead of individual rights, freedom, autonomy and contract). Do such readings 'break' with the western economictheological political tradition Agamben describes? The latter's investigations point to a
Western paradigm of anomic governmentality, derivative of a theological past, which suggests that what Levinas calls 'ethical anarchy' has been captured by economic rationality and endless processes of anomic management that are equally free of ethical constraints as they are from legal and political decision.
I fear that Manderson's reconstructive approach, commendable as it may be, is not able to dislodge the depressing reality Agamben exposes. Manderson's proposal is, in my opinion, nostalgic of pre-Christian or non-Christian pre-modern traditions that western-led modernity has swept aside; the primacy and excess of responsibility over rights and of ethics over law has been used before, for instance in order to evoke a contrast between responsibility-centred Jewish law and a rights-based western model of law; 14 there is little to add here apart that this retraces a distinction that has, by now, been contained in the globalised occidental paradigm postulating an economic relation between all 'positive' and all 'natural' laws the tension of which is structured by the idea of a sovereign working on the advice of his managerial staff. This suspicion also casts its shadow on those within socalled 'critical jurisprudence' who invoke absolute ethical responsibility both to denote the deficiency of law without justice and to call on us to assume the all-compassing, extra-legal responsibility before 'the Other'. Levinas, by contrast, deliberately described ambiguously 
